Introduction
Contrary to models with a finite number of infinitely-lived agents in which the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient and locally unique, Pareto inefficiency and local multiplicities arise whithin models with an infinite number of finitely-lived agents. 1 The possibility of dynamic inefficiency in the overlapping generations (OLG) model with production has been initially demonstrated by Diamond [12] . It is related to the over-accumulation of the capital stock with respect to the Golden Rule. In other words, it is associated with too high a saving rate, and a Pareto-improvement can be achieved by allowing the current generation to devour a portion of the capital stock while leaving the consumption of all future generations intact.
In spite of the sub-optimality of the competitive equilibrium in the Diamond [12] OLG model, it is well-known that, under gross substitution in consumption, endogenous business cycle fluctuations cannot occur. In contrast, in two-sector models, endogenous fluctuations arise when the consumption good sector is capital intensive even under a gross subtitutability assumption. The input allocations across sectors, which are driven by Rybczinsky and Stolper-Samuelson effects, then generate oscillations of the capital accumulation path. 2 Moreover, local indeterminacy and expectations-driven fluctuations may also arise.
Interestingly, and as this was shown by Reichlin [22] , local indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations can occur under dynamic inefficiency in a twosector OLG model with Leontief technologies. However, a clear understanding of the relationship between dynamic efficiency and local determinacy with positive elasticities of capital-labor substitution is still missing.
The central question raised in this paper is then whether the dynamic efficiency of the intertemporal allocation of capital may be a strong enough property of the competitive equilibrium to prevent the occurrence of endogenous fluctuations. The answer is positive: we prove that the conditions for dynamic efficiency rule out aggregate volatility derived from local sunspot equilibria, and that local indeterminacy arises when the steady state is dynamically inefficient. 3 Our conclusions appear to be at odd with previous analysis of OLG models in which it is claimed that there is no general connection between determinacy of equilibrium and Pareto efficiency. But, all the known examples of the co-existence of local indeterminacy and Pareto efficiency are based either on pure exchange economies or on production economies in which the standard assumption of gross substitutability is violated (see for instance Kehoe and Levine [18] , Woodford [24] ).
We consider a formulation of the two-sector OLG model based upon standard sectoral technologies. We also assume a life-cycle utility function which is linearly homogeneous with respect to young and old consumptions so that the propensity to consume, or equivalently the share of first period consumption over the wage income, only depends on the gross rate of return on financial assets and the saving function is linear with respect to wage.
Building on this property, we provide simple conditions on the propensity to consume for the existence of a steady state.
Our analysis first focuses on the dynamic efficiency properties of competitive equilibria. We show that the steady state is lower than the Golden Rule capital stock if and only if the share of first period consumption over the wage income is large enough. We also prove that under this condition, any competitive equilibrium converging to the steady state is dynamically efficient.
The dynamic efficiency properties of the two-sector OLG model has not been studied until the recent contribution by Cremers [10] . She shows, as in the current paper, that it is associated with a stationary capital stock lower than the Golden Rule level. However, her results are based upon the assumption of a globally unique monotonically converging perfect foresight equilibrium, and she does not provide any conditions on the fundamentals that ensure the existence of a steady state which is exceeded by the Golden-Rule. In opposition to her contribution, our dynamic efficiency condition applies even in the case of a non-monotonic convergence process of the competitive equilibrium.
On this basis, our aim is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the relationships between dynamic efficiency and local determinacy, but to focus on reasonable restrictions on the fundamentals. Under the standard assumptions of gross substitution in consumption and of a capital intensive consumption good, we prove in a first step that dynamic efficiency holds under three conditions: i) the share of first period consumption over the wage income is large enough, ii) the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is low enough, and iii) the sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution are large enough. But at the same time, we show that these conditions, which are compatible with plausible parameterizations of the fundamentals, imply the local determinacy of the generically unique steady state and thus rule out local sunspot fluctuations. In a second step, we consider the configuration with a low enough share of first period consumption over the wage income which implies that the steady state is larger than the Golden Rule capital stock and thus that the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. We then prove that local indeterminacy easily arises without requiring strong technological restrictions but provided the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is large enough.
This paper is organized as follows: the next section sets up the basic model. In Section 3 we prove the existence of a steady state and we give conditions for dynamic efficiency of the intertemporal competitive equilibrium. 2 The model
Consumption and savings
The economy is populated by finitely-lived agents. In each period t, N t persons are born, and they live for two periods. In their first period of life (when young), the agents are endowed with one unit of labor that they supply inelastically to firms. Their income directly results from the real wage. They allocate this income between current consumption and savings which are invested in the firms. In their second period of life (when old ), they are retired. Their income is given by the return on the savings made at time t. As they do not care about events occurring after their death, they consume their income entirely. The preferences of a representative agent born at time t are thus defined over his consumption bundle (c t , when he is young, and d t+1 , when he is old) and are summarized by the utility function u(c t , d t+1 /B), with B > 0 a scaling constant. Each agent is assumed to have 1 + n > 0 children so that population is increasing at constant rate n, i.e., N t+1 = (1 + n)N t . Under perfect foresight, and considering w t and R t+1 as given, a young agent maximizes his utility function over his life-cycle as follows:
Assumption 1 implies the existence and uniqueness of interior solutions for optimal saving φ t . Using the homogeneity of u(c t , d t+1 /B), the first order conditions state as:
The normality of c t implies g ′ (d/cB) > 0 and we get under Assumption 1:
with α(R/B) ∈ (0, 1) the propensity to consume of the young, or equivalently the share of first period consumption over the wage income. We also conclude that the first order condition (4) becomes:
In the rest of the paper we introduce the following standard Assumption:
Assumption 2. The consumption levels c t and d t+1 are gross substitutes.
Such a restriction implies that the saving function (6) is increasing with respect to the gross rate of return R. Note also that Assumption 2 is satisfied if and only if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption γ(R/B), as given by:
Production
There are two produced goods, one consumption good y 0 and one capital good y. The consumption good, which cannot be used as capital, is entirely consumed, and the capital good cannot be consumed. There are two inputs, capital and labor. We assume complete depreciation of capital within one period and also that labor is inelastically supplied. Each good is produced with a standard constant returns to scale technology:
with k 0 + k 1 ≤ k, k being the total stock of capital, and l 0 + l 1 ≤ ℓ, ℓ being the total amount of labor.
increasing in each argument, concave, homogeneous of degree one and such that for any x > 0, f
By definition we have y ≤ f 1 (k, ℓ). The monotonicity properties and the Inada conditions in Assumption 3 then imply that there isk(ℓ) > 0 solution
, and f 1 (k, ℓ) < k when k >k(ℓ). It follows that it is not possible to maintain stocks beyond k(ℓ). The set of admissible 3-uples (k, y, ℓ) is thus defined as follows
There are two representative firms, one for each sector. For any given (k, y, ℓ), profit maximization is equivalent to solving the following problem of optimal allocation of productive factors between the two sectors: The social production function T (k, y, ℓ) describes the frontier of the production possibility set associated with interior temporary equilibria (k, y, ℓ) ∈K, and gives the maximal output of the consumption good. Under Assumption 3, for any (k, y, ℓ) ∈K, T (k, y, ℓ) can be shown to be homogeneous of degree one, concave and twice continuously differentiable. 6 Denoting w the wage rate, r the gross rental rate of capital and p the price of investment good, all in terms of the price of the consumption good, we may formulate the aggregate profit maximization problem as follows
and we derive that for any (k, y, ℓ) ∈ int(K), the first-order derivatives of the social production function give
Perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium
Total labor is given by the number N t of young households, i.e., ℓ t = N t , and is thus increasing at rate n, i.e., ℓ t+1 = (1 + n)ℓ t . We then define a perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium:
given, is a perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium if: i) (k t , y t , ℓ t ) solves (10) for any t ≥ 0 and (r t , w t , p t ) is given by (11) with
Let us denote κ t = k t /ℓ t the capital-labor ratio at time t ≥ 0 and letκ ≡ k(ℓ)/ℓ be the maximal admissible value of κ. We can then redefine the set of admissible paths given by (8) as follows
Using the linear homogeneity of T (k, y, ℓ), we derive from Definition 1 that a perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium satisfies the following equation:
with (κ t , κ t+1 ) ∈ int(K) and κ 0 =κ 0 =k 0 /l 0 given.
3 Steady state and dynamic efficiency
Existence
A steady state is defined as
all t with κ * solution of the following equation
We will consider in the following a family of economies parameterized by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption γ(R/B). The steady state κ * clearly depends on the characteristics of technologies and preferences. As a result, varying γ(R/B) generates modifications of the value of the stationary capital-labor ratio and thus implies variations of all the other shares and elasticities characterizing the technologies and preferences.
This property significantly complicates the local stability and bifurcation analysis. To simplify, we follow the same procedure as in Lloyd-Braga et al. [20] : building on the homogeneity property of the utility function, we use the scaling parameter B in order to give conditions for the existence of a normalized steady state κ * ∈ (0,κ) which will remain invariant as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is varied. Therefore, for a given set of parameters characterizing the technologies and preferences, we will be able to isolate the role of γ(R/B) on the local stability properties of competitive equilibria.
Let us denote z = R/B. Under Assumption 2, the share of first period consumption α(z) is a monotone decreasing function with lim z→0 α(z) = α sup and lim z→+∞ α(z) = α inf . By definition, we have (α inf , α sup ) ⊆ (0, 1). Now let us define from (13):
By choosing appropriately the value of κ * ∈ (0,κ), we may derive a corresponding Φ κ * ∈ (α inf , α sup ). We then get:
Then there is a unique value B(κ * ) > 0 for the scaling parameter
such that κ * is a steady state if and only if B = B(κ * ).
Proof : See Appendix 6.1.
In the rest of the paper we will assume that the scaling parameter B adjusts to B = B(κ
Dynamic efficiency
Our aim is to analyze the dynamic efficiency properties of the competitive equilibrium around the NSS. From (5), (7), (16), and
Using definition 1 and the homogeneity
) the share of capital in total income as given by
and we derive from (15) the stationary gross rate of return along the NSS:
It is well-known since Diamond [12] that if too much capital is accumulated in the long run, the economy is dynamically inefficient. Such a situation occurs if the population growth factor 1+n exceeds the steady state marginal product of capital. Following Phelps [21] , it is then said that the capital-labor ratio exceeds the Golden Rule level. In a two-sector OLG model, the Golden Rule level of capital-labor ratio, denotedκ, is characterized from the total stationary consumption which is given by the social production function:
Along a stationary path of capital, the highest utility is defined as the maximum of u(c, d) subject to (18) . There is no other restriction than the nonnegativity of capital and consumptions, and the maximum of utility implies the maximum of the consumption good's output T (κ, (1 + n)κ, 1). As in the aggregate Diamond formulation [12] , the Golden-Rule capital-labor ratioκ is independent of the intertemporal allocation of consumption:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, there is a unique optimal stationary path (κ,ĉ,d) which is characterized by the following conditions:
withκ the Golden-Rule capital-labor ratio.
Proof : See Appendix 6.2.
We now characterize the dynamic efficiency properties of equilibrium paths. Building on Proposition 2, they are appraised through the comparison of the NSS with respect to the Golden Rule. Indeed, the concept of efficiency is introduced following Cass [7] . Obviously, any efficient path needs to be feasible. Hence, a path of capital stocks per capita {κ t } t≥0 is called feasible
path of capital stocks per capita {κ t } t≥0 is inefficient if there is another feasible path {κ ′ t } t≥0 such that, on the one hand, κ ′ 0 = κ 0 and for any t ≥ 0,
, and, on the other hand, there is
. As a result, a feasible path is efficient if it is not inefficient.
Considering the stationary gross rate of return as defined by (17), we then derive a condition on the share of first period consumption over the wage income α to get a NSS lower than the Golden Rule level and to ensure the dynamic efficiency of equilibria: ii) an intertemporal competitive equilibrium converging towards the NSS is dynamically efficient if α ∈ (α, 1) and dynamically inefficient if α ∈ (0,α). Proof : See Appendix 6.3.
Proposition 3 shows that if the labor income is relatively lower than the capital income, i.e., s ≥ 1/2, then a young agent does not have enough wage resources to provide a large amount of savings so that an under-accumulation of capital is obtained without additional restriction. On the other hand, if the labor income is relatively larger than the capital income, i.e., s < 1/2, then a young agent receives enough wage resources to be able to provide a large amount of savings. In this case, over-accumulation of capital can be avoided provided his share of first period consumption over the wage income is large enough. Note also that our condition for an under-accumulation of capital α ≥α can be equivalently reformulated as in Phelps [21] , namely the aggregate saving rate ς ≡ (1 − α)w/(w + rk) = (1 − α)(1 − s) needs to be lower than the share of capital in total income s, i.e., ς ≤ s.
The criterion for dynamic efficiency provided in Proposition 3 is first based upon a NSS which is characterized by an under-accumulation of capital, i.e., a large enough amount of first period consumption. Second, it is based upon a NSS which is stable. Our model consists in one predetermined variable, the current capital stock, and one forward variable, the next period capital stock. Therefore, stability of the NSS can be understood in two different ways: if the dimension of the stable manifold is equal to one, then the NSS is saddle-point stable. For a given initial capital stock, there is a unique converging equilibrium path. In such a case, the NSS is locally determinate. 10 If, on the contrary, the dimension of the stable manifold is equal to two, there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from the same initial capital stock and converging to the NSS. In this case, the NSS is locally indeterminate. The dynamic efficiency property of the NSS will be appraised through these two types of stability.
10 If the dimension of the stable manifold is equal to zero, the NSS is totally unstable but we still call it locally determinate as there exists no equilibrium path converging to it.
4 Dynamic efficiency and local determinacy
The approach
Let us introduce the relative capital intensity difference across sectors
and the elasticity of the rental rate of capital
evaluated at the NSS. Note that the elasticity ε rk is introduced for analytical tractability. However, as shown in Drugeon [13] , we can relate ε rk to the sectoral elasticities σ 0 and σ 1 of capital-labor substitution, namely:
It follows that ε rk is a decreasing function of σ 0 and σ 1 .
Proposition 1 shows that when the scaling parameter satisfies B = B(κ * ), the NSS κ * and the share of first period consumption over the wage α = Φ κ * remain constant as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution γ is made to vary. As in Grandmont et al. [16] , and under the gross substitutability Assumption 2, we will then study the variations of the trace T (γ) and the determinant D(γ) in the (T , D) plane as γ varies continuously within (1, +∞).
Assuming that b = 0, linearizing the difference equation (13) around the NSS and solving T and D (as given in Appendix 6.4) with respect to α(γ − 1) yields the following linear relationship ∆(T ):
where the slope S of ∆(T ) is
The determinacy properties of the steady state
Under gross substitutability, i.e., γ > 1, the NSS is locally determinate as soon as b ≥ 0 since in this case D > 1 (see Appendix 6.4). Therefore, local indeterminacy of the NSS, which is necessarily based on D < 1, requires a capital intensive consumption good, i.e., b < 0. In the rest of the paper we will then focus on this configuration and we will also restrict the share of capital in total income in order to get a positive value for the bound
Assumption 4. b < 0 and s ∈ (0, 1/2).
Dynamic efficiency and local uniqueness
Let us start with a simple configuration in which we assume a slightly stronger condition than the one ensuring an under-accumulation of capital. Proof : See Appendix 6.5.
In two-sector models with a gross substitutability assumption, the ex- is related to the stability of the equilibrium path. As local determinacy is compatible with a saddle-point stable or a totally unstable NSS, we need to find conditions for the saddle-point stability of the NSS.
As shown in Appendix 6.5, three critical bounds on b are crucial for the stability properties of the NSS:
Note that when α > max{α, 1/2}, b 0 < b 1 , b 2 . There also exists a critical boundε rk > 0 for the elasticity of the rental rate of capital which has to be considered in some cases. In Figure 1 we first assume extreme values for b
In both cases, saddle-point stability is obtained for any value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption γ > 1. However, when b ∈ (b, 0), the elasticity of the rental rate of capital needs to be sufficiently low.
Consider now the case of intermediary values for b. Two different types of configurations may be derived depending on whether b 1 is lower or larger than b 2 . Let us start in Figure 2 with the case b 1 < b 2 which is obtained when α < s/(1 − s) and s > 1/3. get the same picture as in Figure 1-i) . It is worth noting at this point that the conditions on ε rk and γ are standard to obtain saddle-point stability.
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Moreover, as shown by Figures 1 and 2 , they ensure that the characteristic roots cannot equal 1 (since the ∆-half-line cannot cross the line AC) and thus that the steady state is unique. Proof : See Appendix 6.6.
As shown in (21), a low value for ε rk requires large enough sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution. Theorem 1 then proves that for a large enough amount of capital-labor substitution, a dynamically efficient steady state cannot be locally indeterminate. Contrary to the case with dynamic efficiency, under dynamic inefficiency local indeterminacy can arise without any restriction on the sectoral elasticities of capital labor substitution.
Remark 2:
There is also a case in which (T ∞ , D ∞ ) belongs to the region where the NSS is saddle-point stable. Indeed, assuming that α ∈ (0, min{α, 1/2, s/(1 − s)}), b ∈ (b 1 , b 0 ) and ε rk >ε rk , we get the following geometrical representation: 
Concluding comments
We have considered a two-sector two-periods overlapping generations model with inelastic labor, consumption in both periods of life and linearly homogeneous preferences. Under standard conditions on preferences and technologies, we prove that if the share of first period consumption over the wage income is large enough, dynamic efficiency holds and sunspot fluctuations are ruled out. Moreover, as soon as we consider a low enough share of first period consumption over the wage income which implies dynamic inefficiency of the NSS, we show that local indeterminacy arises without requiring strong restrictions on the sectoral elasticities of capital-labor substitution.
The main limitation of our approach results from the local dimension of our dynamic efficiency. Using the Cass [7] criterion, a global analysis of dynamic efficiency could be considered. This is left for future research.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the set K as defined by (12) . Then κ * ∈ (0,κ) is a solution of (14)
From (3) and (5), we get R/(g −1 (R/B)B) ≡ α(R/B)/(1 − α(R/B)). Taking elasticities of both sides yields
Assumption 2, which is equivalent to γ(R/B) > 1, implies that α(z) is a monotone decreasing function with lim z→0 α(z) = α sup , lim z→+∞ α(z) = α inf and (α inf , α sup ) ⊆ (0, 1). Figure 6 below provides an illustration of α(z). Figure 6 : Share of first period consumption α(z).
It follows that α(z) admits an inverse function defined over (α inf , α sup ).
Let κ * ∈ (0,κ) be such that Φ κ * ∈ (α inf , α sup ). We then derive
and κ * is a steady state if and only if B = B(κ * ).
Proof of Proposition 2
It is shown in Benhabib and Nishimura [3, 4] and Bosi et al. [5] that
with a ≡ k 0 /l 0 > 0, b as defined by (19) and T 11 < 0. Considering that
, we derive:
Linear homogeneity of T (k, y, ℓ) implies:
Consider the input coefficients in each sector as defined by a 00 = l 0 /y 0 ,
gives wa 01 + ra 11 = p or equivalently p(1 − Ra 11 ) = wa 01 > 0. From the definition of b given by (19) we finally obtain 1 − Rb = a 00 (1−Ra 11 )+Ra 10 a 01 a 00 > 0 and R ′ (κ) < 0. Consider now the first order condition for a maximum of the total stationary consumption (18) with respect to κ:
This is equivalent to the equation defining the stationary capital-labor ratio of a two-sector optimal growth model with inelastic labor supply, no discounting and full depreciation of capital. Since R ′ (κ) < 0, the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Becker and Tsyganov [1] applies and there is a unique solutionκ of (30).
Along a stationary path of capital stocks, the highest utility is finally defined as the maximum of u(c, d) subject to (18).
Proof of Proposition 3
From (17), we get R * > 1 + n if and only if α >α. The rest of the proof is based upon arguments similar to the ones introduced in Chapter 2 (Proposition 2.4, p. 83) of de la Croix and Michel [11] .
14 Let us start with the case in which the NSS is characterized by an under-
We will show that increasing consumption for one period t 1 without reducing it at any other period leads to a contradiction. Recall that the ratio of total consumption over labor is given by C t = c t +d t /(1+n) = T (κ t , (1+n)κ t+1 , 1).
Under-accumulation implies that
Along a converging equilibrium path we have for 14 We provide an extension to the two-sector framework of the dynamic efficiency property derived within an aggregate Diamond model. The whole argument is based upon the concavity of the social production function T and does not depend on the sign of the capital intensity difference across sectors.
At any date t, the difference from another feasible pathκ t satisfies
The concavity of T then implies
Assume therefore that consumption never decreases. It follows that capital never increases. Indeed, by induction, ifκ t − κ t ≤ 0, which obviously holds at t = 0, and if ∆C t ≥ 0 then the previous inequality impliesκ t+1 − κ t+1 ≤ 0.
Assume moreover that there is some date t 1 > 0 such that ∆C t 1 > 0. Then the previous argument impliesκ t − κ t < 0 for any t > t 1 and, for t > t 2 = max{t 0 , t 1 }, we getκ
As z > 1 and κ t+1 converges to the NSS, we have the fact thatκ t+1 − κ t+1
converges to −∞ andκ t+1 becomes negative, which is not possible.
Consider now the case in which the NSS is characterized by an over-
We will show that we can lower the stock of capital and increase consumption at one date without reducing consumption at another date. Consider an equilibrium path converging to the NSS. In a neighborhood (κ
Let us decrease the stock of capital by ǫ after date t 0 and forever. Concavity of T (k, y, ℓ) with respect to y implies:
Therefore, investment κ t 0 +1 is reduced by ǫ and consumption T (κ t 0 , (1 +
Since over-accumulation implies φ ′ (ǫ) > 0 we conclude that consumption can be increased for all periods and the path is dynamically inefficient.
Characteristic polynomial
Lemma 6.1. Under Assumptions 1-3, the characteristic polynomial is
Proof of Proposition 4
As γ ∈ (1, +∞), the fundamental properties of ∆(T ) are characterized from the consideration of its extremities. The starting point of the pair (T (γ), D(γ)) is indeed obtained when γ = +∞:
while the end point is obtained when γ = 1:
Moreover, we get 
Proof : i) We get from (17), (33) and Proposition 3 that
ii) The result follows from (34) and (35).
iii) The result immediately follows from (33) and Assumption 4.
iv)-v) Obvious computations from (33) give
The result follows from the fact that −(1 − α)(1 − s)/(1 + n)s > −1 if and only if α >α.
Lemma 6.2 exhibits three critical bounds on b which appear to be crucial for the stability properties of the NSS:
We obtain the following comparisons:
A second Lemma then provides additional information on the slope S and on the intersections of ∆(T ) with the lines AB and AC:
Lemma 6.3. Under Assumptions 1-4, let α >α and b ∈ (b 1 , 0). There existsε rk > 0 such that for given s, α, b and ε rk , the following results hold:
2 -∆(T ) = −1 implies T < 0 in the following cases:
1 -Solving D = 1 in Lemma 6.1 gives
Under α >α, since γ > 1, (38) can be satisfied if and only if b ∈ (b 1 , 0).
Substituting D = 1 into the expression of T allows to get
2 -Solving D = −1 in Lemma 6.1 gives 
ii) and iii) Now let s ∈ (1/3, 1/2), so thatα < 1/2, and α ∈ (α, 1/2). It follows that b 1 < b 0 . Substituting (40) into (41) gives
Therefore when b ∈ (b 0 , 0), We may focus now on the uniqueness property of the steady state. Consider the difference equation (13) as an implicit dynamical system of order two parameterized by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption γ ∈ (1, +∞) that can be written as F (κ t , κ t+1 , κ t+2 ; γ) = 0. Under Assumption 2 and 4 we easily derive that ∂F/∂κ t+2 > 0 and thus there exists a differentiable function G(.) which satisfies κ t+2 = G(κ t , κ t+1 ; γ). It follows that the implicit dynamical system can be converted into an explicit dynamical system of order two as
Consider then the vector function on the interior of the set K defined by (12)
A steady state of (44) is given by H(κ, x; γ) = 0. Obviously, when B = B(κ * ), the NSS satisfies this equation, namely H(κ * , κ * ; γ) = 0, for any γ ∈ (1, +∞).
A simple calculation also shows that the characteristic roots solutions of (31) are the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the right-hand-side of (44) evaluated at the NSS. Thus, if λ 1 and λ 2 are the characteristic roots solutions of (31), the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of H(κ, x; γ) evaluated at the NSS will be given by 1 − λ 1 and 1 − λ 2 . Building on these properties, since γ ∈ (1, +∞), we can consider H(κ, x; γ) as a homotopy on the interior of K over (1, +∞) and apply the methodology used by Benhabib and Nishimura [3] (see Theorem 1 and its proof, pp. 288-290) which is based on the property that the topological degree of H(κ, x; γ) is a homotopy invariant (see also Guillemin and Pollack [17] ). Denoting Z(γ) = {(κ, x)|H(κ, x; γ) = 0}, this implies that if the Jacobian matrix of H(κ, x; γ) evaluated at the NSS is is constant over (1, +∞) and the NSS is generically the unique steady state.
This argument relies on the fact that since the transcritical bifurcation is the generic configuration when one characteristic root root crosses 1, the topological degree evaluated along the NSS would necessarily change if such a bifurcation occurs for some other steady state at some value γ T . Indeed, the two steady states associated with the transcritical bifurcation are distinct when γ = γ T while they are merged when γ = γ T . It follows that under our restrictions, uniqueness of the steady state is a generic property.
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The second Proposition considers the case with s ∈ (1/3, 1/2) and α ∈ (α, 1/2). 
